HNDL is a strategy where an attacker collects encrypted data today and stores it, expecting future capabilities (e.g. quantum) to decrypt it later. It is a time-based risk, not a current break of encryption, and applies mainly to public-key cryptography.
Asymmetric crypto is used for key exchange, authentication, and digital signatures; symmetric crypto then protects data. HNDL concerns focus on asymmetric mechanisms that could become vulnerable. If keys were derived from later-broken asymmetric crypto, previously captured data may become decryptable — not automatic compromise of all traffic.
The main criterion is how long confidentiality must be preserved. At risk: IP, defense data, medical records, long-term financial/legal docs, strategic plans. Low or no HNDL relevance: short-lived sessions, OTPs, public data. Data classification is mandatory to assess HNDL exposure.
HNDL should be treated as a strategic, long-term risk, not an incident response. It matters when an organization stores long-term sensitive data, relies heavily on asymmetric crypto, or faces regulatory constraints. First concrete step: inventory and classify sensitive data by confidentiality duration and value.